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In my view, there is one crucial problem with this line of normative reasoning: 
the normative equating of the ‘war on terror’ with conventional warfare. Name-
ly, concepts such as ‘collateral damage’, which rest on an ultimately utilitarian, or 
‘instrumentalist’ justification, make sense within theories of conventional war-
fare precisely because modern conventional wars (leaving aside pre-modern ex-
amples such as the Thirty Years’ War) are temporally limited phenomena (they last 
a few years, or maybe even a decade, but they are essentially short and intense). 
Because of their short and intense nature, one can argue that conventional wars 
must tolerate phenomena such as ‘collateral damage’, for two reasons: first, if the 
actions that bring about ‘collateral damage’ are strategically essential missions, 
they contribute to a particular conventional war’s being even shorter, i.e. they con-
tribute to its imminent ending; and, second: it can reasonably be expected that 
instances of ‘collateral damage’ in a given conventional war will be few, limited 
in number – in other words, they can be treated as an inevitable ‘aberration’ from 
standard warfare.
However, the ‘war on terror’ is, in my view, a categorially different phenome-
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quite clear that this ‘war’ cannot be treated as a ‘limited’ phenomenon in temporal 
terms – that is, as a ‘war’ within which there is any clear understanding, let alone 
realistic prospect, of what it means to ‘win’ it, or ‘bring it to completion’. When 
reflecting on the two decades of the war on terror and the ‘progress’ achieved so 
far, I believe we can reasonably conclude that its internal logic renders it a tempo-
rally ‘open’ phenomenon – we can hypothetically envisage a ‘victory’, but there is 
no clear prospect of the latter in the empirical world, or any clear understanding 
of the best possible ‘strategy’ for winning it. In that respect, the concept of ‘collat-
eral damage’ is fundamentally undermined in its normative logic, i.e. it is rendered 
meaningless: namely, both the premise that collateral damage is justifiable because 
the operations that produce it are essential for a swift and decisive ‘victory’ in war, 
and the premise that instances of collateral damage will be ‘few’, limited in number, 
are no longer tenable in the context of the ‘war on terror’. On the contrary, we can 
reasonably assume that no single military action (drone strike, for example) will be 
‘essential’ for winning the war, and that the instances of ‘collateral damage’ will, as 
time goes by, became innumerable – in other words, they will become a regulari-
ty, their normative feature of being essentially an ‘aberration’ will no longer exist. 
For these reasons, I contend that the concept of ‘collateral damage’ cannot be used 
to justify civilian casualties of drone strikes and, more broadly, that drone strikes 
cannot be justified as ‘essential’ to winning the ‘war on terror’, as the latter cannot 
be defined as a ‘war’ in any conventional sense of the term.
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My question and preliminary comment on Tamar Meisels’ text in a certain way 
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tions from Michael Walzer’s work that might potentially help in reconstructing 
and strengthening Tamar Meisels’ argument for the use of drones. The first can 
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(Dissent) where he brings up something “very simple:” “Imagine a world, which 
we will soon be living in, where everybody has drones.” The second suggestion, in 
a new way perfectly maximalist, refers to Walzer’s intention that drones become 
something more than they are or could be – for all to have them and for them to 
become “the only game in town” or a “powerful illusion.” Specifically, that some-
thing useful could truly be done with them and that they have the “possibility of 
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If we accept that in our cities or countries there are persons or perhaps small 
groups that will not participate in “democratic” or “patriotic games,” who are there-
fore ready to randomly destroy already constituted groups or portions of a city 
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and a hundred years ago, Husserl spoke of a kind of “pseudo-citizen” – and if they 
were all named with a quasi-Kantian phrase “unjust enemies,” then a right to war 
against them would be infinite (“jus belli contra hostem injustum est infinitum”; 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????-
tirely trivial and negligible. If “a drone strike against X would not be an assassi-
nation, or an extrajudicial execution, or a deprivation of life without due process 
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of these actions in continuity could represent the unconditional condition for the 
improvement of common life in the city, in cities, in the world at large. Introduc-
ing the “unjust enemy,” and Kant speaks about my (or our) “right to his goods, per-
son and life; to use them as means to my ends,” is an introduction into an entire-
ly different understanding of war and victory in war. Kant’s defensive instrument 
(let us call it Kant’s even though he borrows it from other jurists), which in places 
and certain contexts looks truly terrifying, can be reconstructed and recognized 
in various pseudo legal institutions such as herem, homo sacer or piracy. The sin-
gle phrase and status of “unjust enemy” implies the open right to be pursued, rec-
ognized, and destroyed. It seems to me that the origin of Walzer’s first suggestion 
is at this point: the problem is not that everyone has a toy that flies over the city, 
but that everyone has the right to use them in a specific way, to dole out justice 
and kill. Since the city is filled with weapons available, for example in America, 
to everyone (an equally worrisome fact), my attention would rather be directed 
above all to the clear manifestation of one who disposes of drones and completely 
transparently performs certain actions. I would advocate, for example, that only 
certain states – for example the member states of the Security Council of the UN 
– be allowed the right to use drones and conduct with them certain controlled and 
transparent actions. Further, all actions conducted would have to be announced 
and would have to have even the thinnest veil of secrecy removed. Transparen-
cy of action would reduce random victims. The one conducting violence must be 
manifestly responsible for it. Otherwise, drone actions have a religious character 
(conducted by one who appears no longer); citizens are hostages, targets of unjust 
enemies, forced to suffer violence for which centers of power have not taken re-
sponsibility. Most importantly, however, citizens have a reduced right to public 
gathering or grouping in city space. Would this transparency in conducting drone 
action maintain their efficiency? 
